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The Far Right in Europe.
A summary of attempts to define the concept, analyze its identity,
and compare the Western European and Central European far right.
Lubomír Kope?ek1
This article was written as a part of the Research project Political Parties and Representation of Interests
in Contemporary European Democracies (code MSM0021622407).
Abstract:  This  paper  focuses  on  the  far  right  with  emphasis  on  summing  up  some  of  its  more  widespread  definitions,  evaluating  the
reasons for classifying it as a distinctive family of parties, and comparing of the Western European and (post-Communist)
Central European far right. The text presents the theories of Piero Ignazi, Hans-Georg Betz, Cas Mudde, and other authors.
The best working definition of the contemporary far right may be the four-element combination of nationalism, xenophobia, law
and order, and welfare chauvinism proposed for the Western European environment by Cas Mudde. This concept allows for
a basic ideological classification within a unified party family, despite the heterogeneity of the far right parties. Comparison of
Central European far right parties with those of Western Europe shows that these four elements are present in Central Europe
as well, though in a somewhat modified form, despite differing political, economic, and social influences.
Key words: Far right, Law and order, Nationalism, Silent counter-revolution, Welfare chauvinism, Western and Central Europe,
Xenophobia
Introduction
The last decade of the 20th century was accompanied in a number of Western European
countries by the rise of new formations referred to as the radical right, extreme right, right-wing
populist, right-authoritarian, or new radical right. The themes that these parties have used to
define themselves included criticism of immigration from the Third World, the ideas of
multiculturalism, corruption among the traditional political elites and their inability to solve the
problems of regular citizens, excessive tax burden, over-regulation by the state, and deepening of
European integration. These have been closely accompanied by nationalism and moral
traditionalism. However, individual parties have varied significantly in the emphasis placed on
individual themes. These variations were magnified by organizational amorphousness related to
the parties’ presentation of themselves as movement-parties (Kitschelt 2006: 286).
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The rise of these parties naturally led to a boom in interest among political scientists. The
research, however, was marked by very different ideas about these parties on the part of
individual authors. The problem is very closely related to the differing conceptual approaches that have
been developed in this area. It is precisely the issue of conceptualization that remains a broad
topic of discussion and dispute today.
From this fact the first and basic goal of this text is derived: to summarize the basic
approaches to the study of this political phenomenon. In view of its limited scope, this study will
not be an exhaustive account, but rather a selective introduction of some of the most well-known
concepts and an evaluation of them, as well as a critique of their broader applicability. The
second goal of this text is to mull over the question of whether what the author gives the working
label far right can be regarded as a distinctive party family. In other words, does today’s far right
have  a  common  identity?  A  third  task  is  analysis  of  the  similarities  and  differences  between
today’s far right in Western and post-Communist Central Europe. This comparison naturally
offers itself even though it has been nearly two decades since the fall of the Iron Curtain, and
today’s Central Europe is now an integral part of the European Union.
Historical excursion: Fascism and its influence on the far right
In the first half of the 20th century the right extreme of the political spectrum was perhaps
most closely associated with fascism. Its ideological foundations, however, were quite vague, often
eclectically combined with the ideas of other ideologies. Its leading proponents were well aware
of this. As Mussolini rationalized, “… Fascism differs from other programs in its spirit (… ),
which is based on war and victory” (O’Sullivan 1995: 195).
The authors analyzing fascism nonetheless agree on several general characteristics that are
indicative of both branches of fascism, Italian and German (Fritzsche 1977: 470-473; O’Sullivan
1995: 137-188; Heywood 2004: 209-230; Feldman 2006: 455-459; Griffin 2006: 446). Fascism was
typified by the negation of rationalism, progress, freedom, and equality, and generally everything
connected to “the year 1789”. The exception was political activism, which became important for
fascism. Fascism was also characterized by rejection of capitalism, liberalism, communism,
democracy, and the parliamentary system; idealization of the nation, and struggle as the
fundamental impulse of history. Also crucial were the application of the leadership principle and
the cult of the leader, heroism, and corporatism functioning within the organic society. Organic
society, in the view of the fascists, should be spiritually untied and ethnocentric, and its regime
should be founded on a (fascist) movement.
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This is connected to ideas about the creation of a “new man” cleansed of the decadent
layers of the past, permanent revolution as the foundation of social dynamics, a messianic view of
the world, projection of the state as the key unit superseding the interests of the individual, and
an expression of national unity and national autarky. Also indispensable is the role of (variously
understood) myth appearing for example in the Italian idea of completing risorgimento and in the
German concept of belief in the necessity of struggle for regeneration of the Volksgemeinschaft.
The German (national socialist) version of fascism differed from the Italian in its emphasis on
race and the racial principle (division into “superior” and “inferior” races) and its antisemitism.
To view the far right primarily through the prism of fascism was current in political
science long after the Second World War. It was still visible in the first half of the 1980s, when
political scientist Klaus von Beyme in his classic work Parteien in westlichen Demokratien (German
1982, English 1985) was one of the first to outline the concept of party families. With the parties
on the right end of the political spectrum, he could refer in the first place to fascism, in both its
inter-war Italian and German forms, as well as in its various mutations and remnants influenced
by national and period-specific conditions. These mutations and remnants were, of course, as von
Beyme stated, often quite distant from the two main and, fundamentally in some aspects,
divergent models. For example, in the context of Spain von Beyme (1985: 125, 127) wrote: “The
Spanish movement was always a mixture of Fascist (Falange) and traditionalist elements with
right-wing Syndicalist splinters. The party was only a hanger-on of the military movement under
Franco.  After the success of the military putsch the Fascists gained more support as the veteran
organization (… ) but to the sorrow of the old Falangists their Fascist ardour was checked.”
During the course of the next several decades after 1945, various neo-fascist groups were
present on the political and social periphery in the democratic Western regimes. If they were legal
at all, their electoral significance was negligible. The single isolated exception was the post-
Mussolini Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI, Italian Social Movement).
Von Beyme also dealt in a limited way with the rise of new protest movement parties,
whose relation to the broadly-understood fascist tradition was negligible, and could hardly be
considered to have totalitarian tendencies or be taken as manifestations of neo-fascism. He
discusses for example the Poujadism in France in the 1950s, which was based particularly on the
defense of the “ordinary” self-employed, small business owners, and farmers against the big
companies and the state bureaucracy, or both the two Progressive Parties in Denmark and
Norway (the Fremskridtsparti and  the Fremskrittsparti) since the 1970s, when they primarily
protested  against  excess  taxation.  Von  Beyme  (1985:  129)  therefore  speaks  of  the  need  for
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a broader concept of  right-wing  extremism.  In  his  classic  work,  however,  there  was  no  major new
reexamination of the family of far-right parties, probably because of the severe fluctuation of
their voter support, fluid character, and especially the minimal (at that time) political importance
of these formations.
Factors in the rise of the far right in today’s Europe, and the problem of terminology
Since the 1960s many authors have pointed out the impact of the dynamic social and
economic changes on the values and political orientation of voters. Especially well-known in this
regard was the idea by Ronald Inglehart (1971 and 1990) of a “silent revolution” that brought, to
simplify somewhat, a gradual post-materialist value change to a young, educated, and materially-
secure generation, and contributed to the rise of ecological and other left-libertarian parties in the
late 20th century.
In this context it is important for that authors to take note that social and economic
changes  were  also  important  for  the  far  right  and  had  a  major  effect  in  shaping  it  (see  Ignazi
1992; Betz 1993; Norris 2005). They point out, however, the entirely different impact and effect
of these changes on different groups of voters, especially the less-educated, and working people
in industry or agriculture. Among these groups traditional values came into question. One of the
first to take note of this was Piero Ignazi (1992). Contradicting Inglehart, he spoke of a “silent
counter-revolution”. In his opinion the current expansion of the far right is a certain kind of
social reaction within post-industrial societies. The global economy demands a much more
mobile  and  flexible  labor  force.  However,  a  large  portion  of  society  has  had  a  difficult  time
adapting to the changes. They often found themselves in a marginalized position characterized by
long-term unemployment, growing frustration and deprivation, and a longing for renewal of the
previous “status quo” with its traditional relationships, ties, order, and harmony. Regarded as
especially  negative  in  this  context  is  the  influx  of  Third  World  asylum  seekers  and  immigrants
experienced by Western Europe in recent decades, which has “awakened” xenophobia and
racism.
This creates a favorable environment for radical political forces and charismatic leaders
who vow to overcome the growing atomization of society, reject post-materialism, and promise
to quickly solve the problems of unemployment, immigration, criminality, and other demands of
voters who feel threatened. It is no accident that of the traditional parties affected by the rise of
the far right, the most damaged were the Social Democratic parties. Their working-class voters
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are  among  those  for  whom  adaptation  to  changing  circumstances  has  been  most  difficult  (see
Kitschelt 1994).
Before we move on from a description of the factors in the rise of the far right to an
analysis of the conceptual approaches to it, a terminological problem must be addressed.
A vagueness of terms in labeling the family of parties (as mentioned in the introduction) has had
significant conceptual consequences. Perhaps the most frequently appearing term in the work of
the European continent’s non-Anglo-Saxon authors is that of the extreme right (Ignazi 1992;
Mudde 2000a; Holsteyn 2001).
In Germany where, for historic reasons, research has been the most developed in Europe,
researchers also commonly differentiate between extremism and radicalism (e.g. Backes, Jesse 1993).
While the term extremism is associated with the complete rejection of liberal democracy, and
antiparliamentary and anti-constitutional goals, a term with negative connotations, the terms
radicalism and radical reflect are more a path of action which may or may not be anti-democratic.
Sometimes, however, in the German environment the term radical right is perceived as
a transitory category between the extreme and moderate (conservative, Christian democratic)
right (cf. Mareš 2003: 21).
Within the American and the general Anglo-Saxon environment, the most common term
is radical right (e.g. Ramet 1999; Griffin 2000; Norris 2005). But here it has a much broader and
different meaning than in the German environment. It is influenced by the older tradition of
American nativism (anti-immigration sentiment), populism, and hostility to central government
combined with ultra-nationalism, anti-communism, Christian Fundamentalism, and militaristic
orientation (Mudde 2000a: 12-13).
Political scientist Miroslav Mareš (2003: 33), in the context of the discussion over
terminology, calls attention to one problem, namely the overuse of the term extremist in the
media discourse, often by mainstream parties in order to deliberately de-legitimize groups with
the “extreme” label. Mareš therefore proposes for extreme and radical formations the umbrella
term far right,  which  is  so  far  unburdened  by  media  discourse.  The  author  of  this  text  sees  this
appellation as the best solution, and it will be preferred in this text.
Conceptual approaches to the far right
As mentioned above, Piero Ignazi (1992, 1995, 1996, 2003) proposed three criteria that
far right, in his terminology extreme right, parties should fulfill. First, they must be located at the
right end of the left-right continuum, with no party located more to the right. Second, it should
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have an ideological link with Fascist mythology and principles. Third, it must express values,
issues and policies rejecting (and de-legitimizing) the democratic system.
The first criterion is generally acceptable, although the question could be raised how to
classify two or more parties in the same country that are both to the right of the moderate right.
This could be solved by including them in the family of far right parties but pointing out the
differences between them. Much more disputable is the second criterion in view of the fact that
most of the parties classified as far right (let along relevant political parties) do not display the
attributes of fascism, which Ignazi himself recognizes. It is enough, he says, if these parties fulfill
the first criterion, but also the third criterion; that is, it must be an anti-regime (anti-system)
formation. In this context he refers to the traditional concept by Giovanni Sartori (1976) of an
anti-system party, as opposition of principle to the political system as such.
On this basis Ignazi divides the far right into two groups. The first group consists of the
no-longer-relevant and basically residual old traditional parties, which have at least minimal ties to
fascism or its heritage. The second group consists of new post-industrial parties, which are more
successful with the voters. In the first group he includes the non-parliamentary
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National Democratic Party) and the Deutsche
Volksunion (DVU, German People’s Union) or the British National Party (BNP); in the second the
Front National (FN, National Front) in France, the Fremskrittsparti (Progress Party) in Norway, or
the Dansk Folkeparti (DF, Danish People’s Party), which split off from the original Progressive
Party in the 1990s and took its voters with it. Ignazi points to the possible transformation of
identity of some of the parties, and cites as an example the Italian neo-fascist MSI. This
formation changed its name in 1993 to the Alleanza nazionale (AN, National Alliance), broke away
from the fascist tradition, and distanced itself significantly from its previous stance. Ignazi (2003:
200) therefore classified it as a part of the new post-industrial far right.
However, there is a question about some of the parties Ignazi labels as anti-system, his
third  criterion  for  membership  in  the  party  family.  Take  the  examples  of  the Alleanza nazionale
and the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ,  Freedom  Party).  Both  participated  in  the
government  for  significant  periods  at  the  turn  of  the  21st century without trying to destroy the
democratic regime. Despite their radical opinions, it can be doubted that either of these parties
has an anti-democratic goal and is striving to de-legitimize the regime in the sense of Sartori’s
opposition of principle. Ignazi (2003: 32) does maintain that far right parties often “display non-
compatibility of aims and acceptability of behavior”. However, others such as Kurt Luther (2000)
or Marco Tarchi (2003) reject this classification when analyzing the FPÖ and AN. They point out
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the parties’ (similar) efforts at reform of the partitocratic arrangement in the two respective
countries during the 1990s, but these efforts cannot be considered as an attempt to overthrow
democracy. These authors even question the labeling of the Alleanza nazionale and Freiheitliche
Partei Österreichs as extreme-right parties, and point out their closeness to the conservative (in the
Italian case) or liberal (in Austria) parties.
As part of the general framework of the discussion it would be good to take into account
the changed political context, which is significantly different from that prevailing during the Cold
War when Sartori came out with the term anti-system party. During the era after the end of the
Cold War a transformation took place in many of the formerly anti-systemic parties. This was
a process experienced not only by the MSI in Italy but by a number of former Communist
parties. Generally, the result has been that at least some of the far right parties can be considered
only as protest or anti-establishment parties (Schedler 1996: 118; Kubát 2007). Consequently, the
attitude of far right parties toward the liberal democratic regime may today range from the strict
rejectionist to the merely critical of certain negative phenomena that are present workings of
a number of contemporary democratic regimes (corruption, excessive intermingling of the
political and economic spheres, etc.).
A less rigid and much broader definition of the far right than Ignazi’s is offered by Hans-
Georg Betz (1993 a 2004).  He uses term right-wing populist parties. According to Betz these parties
radically oppose the current cultural and socio-political system in the Western democracies, but
without directly attacking its foundations. They reject individual and social equality, and
emphasize cultural or ethnic homogeneity in society, with a preference for “our own people”
over  “foreigners”;  that  is,  for  the  most  part,  immigrants.  This  can  easily  slip  into  xenophobia.
They often emphasize neo-liberal economics, claim to defend the “ordinary person” against the
corrupt establishment and the organs of the state, emphasize “common sense” and law and
order; they are anti-feminist, and regard themselves as defenders of traditional values.
Organizationally they are often led by a popular or even charismatic figure (Jean-Marie Le Pen
and the Front National, Pia Kjaersgaard and the Dansk Folkeparti etc.). They are highly centralized
and  hierarchically  structured,  use  populism  to  get  votes,  and  are  able  to  make  effective  use  of
political marketing.
However, Betz’s approach is not so much an ideological definition as a description of
their political style. In practice this makes the assumption of a common identity among these
parties problematic, and limits the utility of Betz’s approach in constructing a far-right family of
parties, although it must of course be considered a contribution to their general characterization.
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Also relatively well-known is the concept popularized largely by Meindert Fennema and
his colleagues (Fennema 1997; Brug, Fennema, Tillie 2000; Brug, Fennema 2003) that views the
far right, or a large part of it, from the perspective of opposition to immigration. This is reflected
in their use of the working term anti-immigrant parties. However, as demonstrated above,
immigration does represent a very common theme on the far right, but for most of these parties
this is not the one big issue. The above authors attempted to solve this problem by referring to
immigration as a “super-issue”. However, their definition of anti-immigrant parties is too vague
to fit within their basic definition of the far right party family; that is, that (1) they have attempted
to mobilize votes on the basis of anti-immigrant sentiments, and (2) they are stigmatized by the
mainstream political parties (Brug, Fennema, Tillie 2000: 83). One of the doubtful aspects of the
first condition is that the strategy of mobilizing voters by calling for strict regulation of
immigration has also begun to be used by some moderate (mainstream) right-wing parties, for
example the Christian Democratic Appeal in the Netherlands, or the Christian-Social Union in
Germany. The anti-immigrant appeal platform is not particular to any one group of parties
(Strmiska 2001).
For the purposes of this paper it is nevertheless very interesting to follow the view of the
cited authors as they track changes in the electoral base of the far-right parties they have defined
as such. According to comparative research on seven right-wing parties in elections to the
European Parliament in 1994, voter motivation was almost always a combination of pragmatic
protest against immigration, and ideological voting, depending on the closeness of affiliation of
voters to the given party, and their position on the left-right spectrum. Similar research on
elections in 1999 shows a significant growth in the importance of ideological voting at the
expense of protest against immigration, which applied to almost all of the electorally-successful
far-right parties –Alleanza nazionale, Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, Dansk Folkeparti, and the Vlaams
Blok (VB, Flemish Block) in Belgium. On the other hand, with the electorally less-successful
Dutch Centrumdemocraten (CD, Centre Democrats) or the German Republikaner (Republicans) the
dominance of protest voting continued (Brug, Fennema 2003: 68-69). At minimum, however,
this indicates something the ideological structure of their voters’ opinions.
As another possible approach to defining the far right we will present the concept of Cas
Mudde (2000a and 2000b), which can basically be called minimalist. According to Mudde, the
common ideological foundation of the far right combines four elements: nationalism,
xenophobia, law and order, and welfare chauvinism. Welfare chauvinism means that the state
should guarantee that its social policies should work to the benefit of one’s “own people” and
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one’s own nation, and not for that of “foreigners”. The far right prefers a strong state on social
issues and questions of law and order, though economically it may be (at least rhetorically) neo-
liberal.  Mudde  also  points  out  that  the  individual  elements  he  presents  may  have  different
meanings in different parties. Another important point for the discussion of the anti-systemic far
right  is  his  conclusion  based  on  a  study  of  selected  parties  –the Republikaner and  the  DVU in
Germany; and Vlaams Blok, Centrumdemocraten, and Centrumpartij’ 86 (CP’86, Centre Party’ 86) in
the Netherlands. According to Mudde (2000a: 181) all five parties accepted democracy, including
CP’86 and the DVU, which Ignazi classified with the traditional far right. This confirms the
above thesis that for the present-day far right an anti-system orientation is not a necessary part of
the profile.
But Mudde’s approach is likewise unable to make clear the exact boundaries of the far-
right party family, which the author himself confesses. Even so, despite reservations over such
matters as a minimalistic ideological definition of what constitutes the contemporary far right, in
comparison with other concepts Mudde’s one is the most convincing. As a fundamental principle
this concept can be of use in comparing the Western European and post-communist Central
European far right.
Characterization of the far right in Central Europe
The situation  in  Central  Europe  after  1989  has  led  to  differences  in  the  profiles  of  the
region’s far right groups. Perhaps the first thing that should be mentioned is the absence of
immigration from the Third World, which had a significant effect on the rise of the far right
family of parties in the western part of the continent. Anti-immigrant nationalism is almost non-
existent, or appears only as a fringe phenomenon. But a nearly-equivalent “substitute” has
appeared in the form of the numerous traditional national resentments and animosities that
existed in the region before the Communist era, both in relation to neighbors, as well as toward
various minorities. In particular, nationalism influenced by history (and linked to xenophobia)
became  the  most  visible  feature  of  the  local  far  right.  Its  focus  depended  on  specific  national
conditions. For example, the Czech Sdružení pro republiku – Republikánská strana ?eskoslovenska
(SPR-RS?, Association for the Republic – Czechoslovak Republican Party) was hostile to the
Sudeten Germans, Germany as a neighbor, and Gypsies. The Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (MIÉP,
Hungarian  Justice  and  Life  Party)  used  these  resentments  to  push  for  repatriation  of  former
Hungarian territory taken over by neighboring countries after the First World War, and to rail
against the Gypsies. The Slovenská národná strana (SNS, Slovak National Party) denounced
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Hungarians and Gypsies as well; the Slovinska nacionalna stranka (SNS, Slovenian National Party)
demanded the creation of a “Greater Slovenia” including parts of Austria and Italy.
In Central Europe no silent counter-revolution against the wave of post-materialistic
values took place. The reason is the immense predominance of a materialistic outlook in the
various countries, all related to the economic transformation occurring in the 1990s. The negative
social consequences of economic transformation strongly influenced the profile of the local far
right (Ramet 1999: 3-28; Minkenberg 2002; 358-360; Norris 2005: 74-76). It often spoke of
a socially-sustainable economic transformation, and criticized its negative effects. With some
authors this has directly found its way into the terminology as “protest-transformational”
populist parties (Mareš 2006). In practice, nevertheless, some factors in this anti-transformational
vector often exhibited a certain similarity with the social-economic orientation of the Western
Europe far left, especially with its emphasis on social welfare for “our own people” (at the
expense of “outsiders” such as Gypsies). Seen in this way, the Central European phenomenon
might be called an anti-transformation chauvinism.
As with the Western European far right, an emphasis on law and order is found in the
Central European environment as well. But the right’s Central European roots are of a different
nature, and are intertwined with the upheavals that shook the political systems in the region
during the course of the switch to democracy, and uncertainly about the limit of what is and what
is not permitted under the new conditions of freedom. A combination of the relatively weak state
and these uncertainties, accompanied by a sharp rise in the crime rate and a population that felt
threatened by these changes, became fertile ground for the growth of the far right.
The Central European far right was also typified by a strong anti-Communism, much
more markedly than in Western Europe. This was naturally an attempt to take advantage of the
negative reaction in society after 1989 to the long era of Communism and its devastating affects.
The authenticity of this anti-communism, however, was in some cases called into doubt by the
past history of the far right’s leaders (for example the chairman of the Czech SPR-RS? Miroslav
Sládek was employed prior to 1989 as a press censor).
For the existence and success of the Central European far right – just as in Western
Europe – the figure of the party leader was of great importance (Sdružení pro republiku –
Republikánská strana ?eskoslovenska and Miroslav Sládek, Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja and  István
Csurka, Slovenská národná strana and Ján Slota etc.). Another common characteristic of all these
actors was fluctuating voter support, which reflected the vulnerability of their political position.
The  brief  existences  were  made  even  shorter  by  internal  conflicts  ending  with  the  secession  of
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dissatisfied  members.  Their  usual  reason  was  the  authoritative  methods  of  the  party  leader.  In
this sense the Central European far right was no different from that of Western Europe.
For the SPR-RS?, as for the MIÉP or SNS in Slovakia and in Slovenia, another defining
element was opposition to membership in military alliances, especially NATO. This was strongly
influenced by the decades of Soviet hegemony, during which the Central European countries
were left in a subordinate role. It was expressed in calls for neutrality and rejection of any kind of
military pact (Hloušek 2002: 392-393; Benda 2002: 239-240; Mareš 2003: 209-210; Kope?ek 2007:
438-442). In West Europe the issue of NATO was of much less importance for far right parties,
though most did take a negative stance. By the late 20th century when these parties got started, the
question had lost most of its historical explosiveness.
On the other hand, the Central European far right parties did not exhibit the prevailing
hard Euroskepticism of the West European far right, which is based on the rejection of EU
membership, and emphasizes national sovereignty. The far right in Central Europe has usually
been cautious about entering the European Union, and conditioned it on a set of conditions (for
example, special protection for economic sectors such as agriculture, prohibitions on purchase of
real estate by members from the “old” EU member countries, etc.). Usually, however, joining the
EU has not been strictly rejected (with perhaps the only exception being MIÉP). The rest can be
classified as soft euroskeptics (Taggart, Szczerbiak 2002; Szczerbiak, Taggart 2004).
In this context it is necessary to add, however, that among the West European far right
parties there are exceptions to the prevailing hard-Euroskeptic attitude toward European
integration. Especially with parties that entertain ambitions of participating in government,
whether they have made it  in or not (such as Alleanza nazionale, Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, and
the Norwegian Fremskrittsparti), a tendency has been exhibited toward greater flexibility on
questions of European integration (Sitter 2002). It is also important that (broadly defined)
Euroskepticism is a matter that is found not only on the far right, but among conservative parties
and  the  far  left  as  well  (Hooghe,  Marks,  Wilson  2002).  Therefore  it  can  hardly  be  regarded  as
a distinctive element defining the family of the far right, but appears rather as a minor
phenomenon associated with the radical nationalist element of the party family.
Conclusion
To summarize the overview presented above, we may conclude that today’s European far
right forms a relatively heterogeneous entity. There continue to exist significant differences not
only between the Western European and Central European parties, but among the Western
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European far right as well. Another problem is the fact that the mutual dividing line between the
far right and the moderate (conservative) right is becoming ever harder to detect. This is the
result  of  attempts  by  some  of  the  far  right  parties  to  become  more  politically  acceptable  (and
acceptable as part of a government coalition) and change their political profile; moreover, several
of the themes of the far right such as strict regulation of immigration have been adopted by
moderate right-wing parties.
Even so, it would seem possible to set a minimal ideological framework for the far right
by using the concept of Cas Mudde, who presents a combination of four elements: nationalism,
xenophobia, law and order and welfare chauvinism. This foundation is sufficient to be able to
speak of a distinctive family of far-right parties. This does not exclude the idea that the family has
a “hard core” (the French FN, British BNP, or the German NPD) and “soft cover” (the AN in
Italy, FPÖ in Austria, the Progressive Party in Norway, or the Danish People’s Party). Another
significant common characteristic of the family is the absence of the kind of anti-democratic
orientation that was prevalent in the inter-war era.
A look at the far right in Central Europe reveals the various historical-political, social, and
economic factors that strongly influenced their formation, while also leading to some significant
deviations. Of these the most important may be the (evidently temporary) weakness or absence
of anti-immigration sentiment. But if we look at the four fundamental elements of the family, we
can find them in the Central European milieu in modified form. Perhaps the most significant
modification is the presence of an anti-transformation chauvinism that fills the space formerly
occupied by welfare chauvinism in regard to the social and economic situation. It can be assumed
that as the Central European region gradually enters the post-transformation phase, the degree of
convergence between the local far right and the Western European far right will continue.
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